INTRODUCTION
This article considers the common law concept of 'open justice', and explores how Australian and Canadian courts have approached the requirements of open justice. The principles 1 that information about court proceedings should be widely accessible and may be subject to discussion and critical comment (referred to in this article as the principles of open justice) are important ingredients of the rule of law and fundamental to democratic governance. Accessibility of information about courts and their activities is a necessary correlate to the principle that it should be possible to several jurisdictions (including Canada, Australia, and the UK) have enlisted a range of common law and constitutional precepts to protect open justice. The aim of this article is to propose a conceptual framework that may help to bring coherence to future judicial consideration of the principles and limits of open justice, and to consider how well this framework is reflected in Australian and Canadian approaches to open justice.
Contemporary manifestations of the privatisation of court processes vary by jurisdiction and context. 6 They extend well beyond the terrorism prosecutions that have been the focus of much contemporary commentary on open justice and are well documented elsewhere. 7 Given the depth and quality of existing literature, the special procedures adopted for terrorism prosecutions are not a primary focus of this article. Indeed, focusing exclusively on the exceptional example of terrorism makes it easier to overlook broader trends that are emerging in other contexts. This article identifies and analyses impulses towards privileging secrecy over openness within a variety of juridical contexts.
Section 2 of this article offers a theoretical account of open justice. In contrast to existing accounts, I demonstrate that 'open justice' has numerous connotations. Open justice is therefore best described as a set of related principles, not as a single standard. Rather than having a coherent conceptual core, the idea of open justice gestures towards other key democratic and rule of law values. The multivariate nature of open justice makes it particularly susceptible to limitation in some contexts and jurisdictions.
The third section of this paper considers how open justice has been treated in Australian case law and briefly compares that treatment with the Canadian approach. Having identified the common law principles that underpin the concept, section 3 demonstrates that Australian and Canadian judges have adopted different approaches to open justice. The differences between the approaches in these two countries are partly attributable to Canada's constitutionalised human rights protections. However, the Canadian trend towards protecting open justice also reflects a broader judicial interpretation of common law principles. The Supreme Court of Canada has successfully articulated an approach to open justice that balances its benefits against the potential harms of publicity, while accounting for the variety of contexts in which open justice principles are engaged. By contrast, Australian courts have not yet generated a coherent articulation of the principles of open justice, nor have they adopted a consistent position regarding the limits of those principles. However, the _____________________________________________________________________________________ 6 'Privatisation' commonly refers to the transfer of government functions and responsibilities to the private sector. However, it may also include the adoption of government practices that shield public processes from scrutiny. The latter definition is more pertinent in this context. Susan B Boyd, 'Challenging the Public/Private Divide: An Overview' in Susan B Boyd (ed), Challenging the Public/Private Divide: Feminism, Law, and Public Policy (University of Toronto Press, 1997). 
II WHAT IS OPEN JUSTICE?
Open justice is a core principle of the common law. 8 In the United Kingdom and Canada, open justice possesses constitutional status. 9 In these jurisdictions, the constitutional principle is strengthened by human rights protections. 10 For example, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides:
Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: […]
(b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication;
[…] 7. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.
Collectively, these provisions have been interpreted as guaranteeing a right to open justice that may be enforced by the participants in a court process or by the public. In A satisfying theoretical account of 'open justice' must account for three key features. First, the purposes of open justice are multivalent, incorporating both educational and supervisory aspirations. Bentham characterised publicity about court processes as a safeguard to ensure that judges act in accordance with law, probity and evidence; as an incentive to honest testimony; and as a mechanism by which the moral dimensions of law could be broadly conveyed. 11 Constitutional theories of the separation of powers contribute a fourth purpose to Bentham's list: given the courts' role as a check on legislative and executive power, courts are a key source of public information about Given its multiple facets, open justice is perhaps best understood not as a single idea, but as a set of principles that mediate between courts and the public, and are underpinned by broader values. 13 Specifically, open justice relates information about what happens in courts to other aspects of democratic governance and to the rule of law. 14 These attributes apply to all of the disparate activities termed 'open justice', and have the potential to provide a touchstone for courts when deciding whether to expand or limit open justice in a particular case. In safeguarding public access to information about courts and their activities, open justice provides a set of principles that facilitate other liberal democratic values -the right to know the law and to understand its application, the salutary effects of permitting citizens to observe and evaluate the operation of government, and a repugnance for arbitrary power. However, the focus on information about court processes is a necessary but not sufficient definition of open justice -the common law places many limits on citizens' capacity to know about some aspects of the activities that occur in courts. The ban on knowing the substance of jury deliberations is an obvious example. Arguably, in order to be enlivened, an open justice principle must connect information about courts with another aspect of democratic participation or a dimension of the rule of law.
Existing accounts of open justice tend to focus on one of its dimensions to the partial exclusion of others. For example, Joseph Jaconelli suggests that the 'ideal of open justice may be simply stated'. 15 According to Jaconelli, it is a procedural dimension of the right to a fair trial, requiring openness in the hearing phase; it is also a means to an end (perhaps truth or justice, although Jaconelli does not specify). 16 
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Volume 40 ____________________________________________________________________________________ being overwhelmed by sensational reporting. 17 He is primarily interested in access to courtrooms and the media's desire to disseminate criminal proceedings to a broader public, including by televising trials. Accordingly, Jaconelli pays less attention to judicial reasons and court records. Within this context, he argues for careful limits to be imposed on the 'trial as public spectacle'. 18 Within the US literature, open justice is often treated as promoting informed public debate about individual and corporate behaviour. Discussion tends to focus on whether more or less information should be publicly accessible about certain types of cases. 19 A form of open justice principle -characterised as a citizen's right to know and discuss the details of civil and criminal proceedings -is frequently weighed against individual and corporate privacy interests. 20 One important site of contest is obtaining access to materials discovered by a party in civil litigation, whether or not they are used in court. 21 This engages quite different aspects of open justice from Jaconelli's discussion. The focus here is on the public capacity to assess activities undertaken by corporations and individuals in non-judicial contexts that predate the court proceeding. Court records, rather than courtrooms, are at the centre of the debate. Finally, the constitutional right to freedom of expression is at times engaged to argue for an unlimited power to obtain access to and publish court records whether or not they have been used in open court. 22 The implication of discussions about discovered documents tends to be that privacy interests and open justice are in tension with one another, if not antithetical. 23 The challenge that consequently arises is finding a proportionate course between privacy and access to public records.
The Bentham adopts a similar characterisation, Bowring, above n 3, 355. 24 Roach, above n 7, 78-9. and the power to report hearings. 25 Procedures established to prevent the accused or the public from knowing some evidence challenge the capacity to gain access to and speak about court records and the judicial practice of writing and publishing reasons. However, concerns about rules that limit disclosure are most often characterised primarily as negatively impacting the accused person's right to a fair trial. Given this primary concern, the open justice dimension of a public right to know the details of a case frequently becomes supplementary.
A final set of circumstances in which open justice is often invoked arises when judges are asked to prohibit publication of the identity of witnesses or parties, including the accused. 26 The rationale given for this request varies, but may include protecting the privacy of victims of crime or other vulnerable individuals, 27 protecting the privacy of an accused prior to conviction or of an offender after community release, 28 or ensuring the safety of undercover police. 29 A request to prevent publication of identity may include a request to suppress identity within the courtroom. The principles of open justice at stake in these contexts vary with the rationale, but are primarily concerned with the need to test the truth of a witness's account. Where state action is being protected through anonymity, concerns about executive power also arise. In cases where identity is suppressed, limits on open justice are defined by the conflict with rights to privacy, dignity and equality, and (where police or informers are protected) by tension with executive efficacy. 
A

An introduction to common law principles
In 1893, Kay LJ identified the 'extreme importance that publicity should be given to all judicial proceedings.' 30 The UK Supreme Court opened its first judgment of 2010 as follows:
'Your first term docket reads like alphabet soup.' With these provocative words counsel for a number of newspapers and magazines highlighted the issue which confronts the Court in this application. In all the cases down for hearing in the first month of the Supreme Court's existence at least one of the parties was referred to by an initial or initials. 31 The Court went on to hold unanimously that the public interest in having access to information about court proceedings outweighed the privacy interests of five British nationals who were believed to be involved in terrorist activities:
the legitimate interest of the public is wider than the interest of judges qua judges or of lawyers qua lawyers. Irrespective of the outcome, the public has a legitimate interest in not being kept in the dark [.] ... At present, the courts are denying the public information which is relevant to that debate, even though the whole freezing-order system [of counter-terrorism measures] has been created and operated in their name. 32 Recognising the multiplicity of values that are potentially engaged when open justice is at stake, the UK Supreme Court emphasised that the public interest in disclosing the details of court proceedings must be balanced against privacy rights on a case-by-case basis. Nonetheless, In re Guardian News and Media Ltd and others holds that judges should avoid issuing anonymity orders unless there is specific evidence of potential harm to privacy or another protected right, even in terrorism-related cases. Where specific evidence of a potential harm to privacy is offered, it remains essential to demonstrate that this harm outweighs the harm that will be caused by the requested limitation to freedom of expression. While the primary contribution of the case is that it sets out an approach to managing conflicting rights and freedoms under the European Convention on Human Rights, Guardian News and Media also restates and affirms the benefits of the common law presumption of openness in judicial proceedings. Decided more than a century after Kimber v Press Association, Guardian News and Media suggests that the highest UK court continues to regard the principles of open justice as integral to the common law tradition despite political pressures to keep the state response to terrorism shrouded in secrecy.
The leading common law case on open justice is Scott v Scott. 33 A marriage nullification had occurred in camera. The appellant and her solicitor subsequently shared notes of the hearing with persons who had not been party to the proceeding. On appeal from a finding of contempt, the House of Lords was asked to consider whether the original order to close the courtroom was within the trial judge's power. A majority of Law Lords agreed that no jurisdiction existed to close the court. However, they had differing views about whether and when a judge possessed the common law power to close a courtroom. Viscount Haldane held: 'If there is any exception to the broad principle which requires the administration of justice to take place in open court, that exception must be based on the application of some other and overriding principle'. 34 Viscount Haldane proposed a test of necessity for such exceptions, identifying examples where necessity is met. 35 Earl Halsbury preferred to leave the consideration of exceptions to the open court principle to another case. 36 Earl Loreborn suggested that a courtroom could be closed in a limited category of cases. 37 Lord Shaw spoke most strongly in support of open justice, suggesting that the orders made by the trial judge 'constitute a violation of that publicity in the administration of justice which is one of the surest guarantees of our liberties and an attack upon the very foundations of public and private security.' 38 Lord Shaw quoted extensively from Bentham, holding that there are very limited circumstances in which privacy is warranted, and that the scope of any non-publicity order must be limited in duration. 39 While the lack of jurisdiction to close the court and prevent publication in Scott v Scott was broadly agreed, the precise limits on judicial power were more contested. The variety of approaches adopted reflects conceptual uncertainty about the function and limits of open justice. Depending on whether one prefers Viscount Haldane's reasoning to that of Earl Loreborn or Lord Shaw, the circumstances in which a courtroom may be closed could be limited to a set of categories established by precedent or governed by an overarching test of necessity.
B
The Australian approach to open justice
Scott v Scott has had significant influence on Australian jurisprudence, but the variety of ratios adopted by the judges has bequeathed some uncertainty within the Australian _____________________________________________________________________________________ 33
[1913] AC 417 (House of Lords). 34 Ibid 435. 35 Ibid 438. 36 Ibid 442.
37
Ibid 445-6. 38 Ibid 476.
39
Ibid 482-3.
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Volume 40 ____________________________________________________________________________________ law. 40 More recently, an emerging jurisprudence suggests that open justice may also be protected -at least to some extent -by the principle of institutional integrity that regulates legislative and executive relationships with courts under Chapter III of the Australian Constitution. In Canada, open justice is regarded as a strong but defeasible common law right, which is subject to limits on a case-by-case basis where countervailing interests prevail. While Scott v Scott was initially influential, the Supreme Court of Canada ultimately adopted a more coherent approach.
The Australian approach to open justice has at least two strands. A well-established common law approach establishes a presumption of open justice, permitting limits on open justice where 'necessary for the administration of justice' 41 or 'in the interests of justice'. 42 However, this common law rule will yield to contrary statutory provisions. 43 The second, constitutional, strand has emerged more recently. The High Court of Australia has held that Chapter III of the Australian Constitution proscribes legislatures from conferring a function or imposing a requirement on a judge or court 'which substantially impair[s] its essential and defining characteristics as a court.' 44 The principle that Chapter III protects the continuing institutional integrity of courts arises from, but also refines, the reasoning in Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions. 45 Of the majority, Barwick CJ noted the significance of the open court principle but struck down the impugned legislation on the basis that it constituted an impermissible interference with the states' constitutional power to provide for the organisation and operation of state courts. 48 Gibbs and Stephen JJ wrote separate reasons from Barwick CJ and from one another, concurring in the result. Both Gibbs and Stephen JJ characterised the provision mandating closed courts as one which altered both the character of proceedings conducted under the Act, and the character of the courts charged with hearing those proceedings. Gibbs and Stephen JJ held that openness is an essential part of the character of common law courtrooms, and that mandating closed courtrooms changed the court into a different type of tribunal. However, Gibbs J would have upheld the constitutionality of the provision if it had merely granted trial judges the discretion to close courts in appropriate cases. 49 The distinction between granting discretion and mandating closed courts remains important under the emerging constitutional principle of institutional integrity. There appear to be a limited number of general exceptions to the 'open justice' principle, ... namely: (a) cases where trade secrets, secret documents or communications or secret processes are involved; (b) cases where disclosure in a public trial would defeat the whole object of the action (as in blackmail cases or cases involving police informers); (c) cases involving the need to keep order in court; (d) cases involving (in certain circumstances) national security; (e) cases involving the performance of administrative or other action that may properly be dealt with in chambers; (f) cases where the court sits as parens patriae involving wards of the state or those with mental illness. 57 Beyond these categories, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal held in Fairfax v District Court that an order prohibiting publication of a judgment may only be made if it is necessary in the sense that the objective of achieving a fair trial in a subsequent case could not be secured in any other way. The Court expressed doubt as to whether such necessity could ever be demonstrated. 58 In R v Kwok, Hodgson JA softened the position that common law exceptions are limited by precedent, holding that the Court 'will not freely invent new categories of cases, but ... may identify categories that, while not coinciding exactly with the existing categories, are very closely analogous to them and have the same rationale for the making of non-publication orders.' 59 In Kwok, the Court held that the privacy interests of complainants in a sex trafficking case were very like those of a complainant in a blackmail case, and that the categories should be expanded accordingly. 60 [I]f this application were allowed it may encourage prosecutors to seek, and judges to make, non-publication orders in cases where the necessity for those orders to advance the interests of justice had not truly been shown. It is important in light of the material relied upon by the prosecution to stress that it is the interests of justice that lie at the heart of such an application and not the interests of a private individual, such as a witness or an accused. The decided cases have emphasised the value of open courts to maintaining public confidence in the administration of justice. 61 In this paragraph, Howie J sets out the competing interests at stake when an application for non-publication of a witness's name is made, and emphasises the primacy of open justice. Howie J preferred that new classes of exceptions be established by Parliament. 62 While Kwok, Fairfax v District Court and Idoport v National Australia Bank suggest that courts possess inherent power to issue non-publication orders that will bind nonparties, the existence of this power was questioned in 64 While the Privy Council has expressed the conclusion that no such power exists, the New Zealand Court held that a power to issue non-publication orders is within the inherent capacity of a court to regulate its own procedures with the ultimate goal of securing fairness.
The NSW Parliament has rendered the question of inherent power less relevant in that jurisdiction by passing the Court Suppression and Non-Publication Orders Act 2010 (NSW), which codifies five broad grounds on which a suppression or non-publication order may be justified. These grounds are not quite the same as those articulated in prior case law, but include the necessity to protect the safety of a person, a limited power to issue orders to prevent embarrassment and a capacity to issue an order where a countervailing public interest outweighs the public interest in open justice. 65 In cases decided since the Act came into force, the NSW Court of Appeal has continued to assert the relevance of prior case law. 66 However, the possibility that some limits on open justice may operate differently from others is being recognised more overtly. 
Volume 40 ____________________________________________________________________________________ circumstances in which these values act in concert. 67 In Rinehart v Welker, Tobias AJA held that open justice was a primary objective of the administration of justice, which exists alongside other objectives. 68 Neither case proposes a methodology for reconciling inconsistencies between such objectives. In fact, the Australian case law is uniformly silent on the questions of how to decide among competing objectives when open justice is at stake, and on what evidence of interference with countervailing interests is needed to support an application to limit open justice. 69 The Victorian Court of Appeal has also held that necessity is the touchstone for non-publication orders. 70 However, in recent cases it has adopted a relatively generous interpretation of necessity. The Victorian Court of Appeal held in News Digital Media Pty Ltd v Mokbel that a trial court possesses inherent jurisdiction to postpone publication of court proceedings, including verdicts, in order to protect trial fairness in an impending trial. 71 The Court applied a test of whether there was a 'real risk' that publishing the material would 'interfere substantially with the administration of justice in a pending proceeding.' 72 Non-publication orders published in these circumstances should be time limited. In News Digital Media Pty Ltd v Mokbel, the Court held that nonpublication orders should not extend to requiring online news services to remove archived articles where those articles are only accessible by searching. 73 The Court held that this order was not necessary to protect trial fairness given the warnings routinely issued to jurors to refrain from researching a case.
While there are some inconsistencies, it is implicit within the judicial discussions of non-publication orders that some principles of open justice -for example, the importance of permitting the public to know about a verdict or judgment -are more vigorously protected than others -for example, the capacity to publish the identity of a witness. 74 Countervailing values also appear to influence the outcome of an application to restrain open justice -for example, News Digital Media Pty Ltd v Mokbel turns on the primacy of an accused person's right to a fair trial, and may fairly be distinguished from the NSW cases which consider a witness's request for privacy. Likewise, in that case the Victorian Court of Appeal explicitly adopts a hierarchy of principles when it treats the interest in reporting evidence given in a court proceeding as more central to open justice than the capacity to report extra-judicial information that readers may find interesting.
Australian whether a right of access to court records existed at common law. 75 The applicant sought access to court records associated with an apprehended violence order issued by consent against a high profile Magistrate. Seemingly distancing itself from the language used by McHugh JA in Fairfax v Police Tribunal, 76 the Court held that open justice is a principle rather than a right; and that the principle does not encompass a routine capacity to obtain access to documents held as part of the court record. 77 Given that an apprehended violence order could be issued without a magistrate being satisfied that the alleged violence had occurred, and as this order was issued by consent, the Court held that it was sufficient for a judge to give reporters access to the fact that a complaint had been laid and a consent order issued, and the terms of the order. However, Spigelman CJ held that a media request for access to documents used in open court should ordinarily be granted, as the principle of open justice is engaged once documents are used in this manner. 78 In Herald & Weekly Times Ltd v Magistrates' Court of Victoria, the Victorian Court of Appeal rejected an argument that there is a right to obtain access to the hand up brief on which many committal proceedings are now decided in Victoria in lieu of hearing oral evidence. However, the Court also held that magistrates have the power to authorise access to this brief. 79 The reasoning adopted in these cases seems in keeping with the proposition that information relied upon by a court is more central to the principles of open justice than information that is contained within the court record but not expressly relied upon. Nonetheless, the tone adopted in these two decisions is notably different from that adopted by the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal in cases concerning non-publication orders. When the capacity to report testimony and judgments is at stake, open justice tends to be treated as an essential good, albeit one which must sometimes yield to more pressing objectives. By contrast, the courts downplay the importance of open justice when considering requests for court records, even when those records have been used in open court. The legitimate concern underlying the court records cases is the possibility that media will report allegations of wrongdoing in a manner that suggests those allegations have been proven. 80 Even so, the courts' reluctance to enforce a stronger principle of access to court records marks a particularly interesting shift. Having access to committal records or to the documentary record on which interlocutory orders are issued is arguably an important dimension of exercising democratic oversight in relation to the actions of courts and Crown prosecutors. 81 Equally, the concern about misreporting allegations of wrongdoing is similarly present For example, this author applied unsuccessfully for copies of the hand-up brief used by the Crown in the committal hearing of Carole Louise Matthey. The case against Matthey for allegedly killing four children was withdrawn after the trial judge excluded much of the Crown evidence against her. See R v Matthey (2007) 17 VR 222. Important questions about prosecutorial discretion and expert witnesses in this case remain unstudied because access to the court records has not been granted (although access to transcripts was provided).
Volume 40 ____________________________________________________________________________________ whenever the media reports oral evidence given or legal arguments made prior to a trial or verdict. It is difficult to identify a principled basis on which textual records should be treated differently than sworn testimony, particularly when the textual record explicitly replaces oral evidence and forms the basis for judicial decisions.
Those who seek to enforce the principles of open justice are often media outlets. Despite this pattern, the Australian case law lacks a consistent approach to the relationship between media and the principles of open justice. Media outlets receive some recognition of their special status by, for example, receiving notice of nonpublication orders and being permitted standing to appeal such orders. However, Hutley AP suggested in Syme v GM-Holden's that there is no special priority attaching to the press or other media. Rather, '[t]he privilege to see what the courts do and say belongs to the public generally.' 82 In Fairfax v Ryde Local Court, Spigelman CJ rejected the proposition that freedom of expression or freedom of the press were legitimate ends of open justice, holding that open justice 'has purposes related to the operation of the legal system.' 83 Some judges have expressed mistrust of the media in the course of adjudicating applications for access. Decisions have aired concerns that media may publicise speculative or prejudicial information about one or another party, thereby damaging reputations and imperilling the right to a fair trial. 84 By contrast, in R v Davis, the Full Federal Court suggested that journalists play a different role in relation to court proceedings from that of other observers:
Whatever their motives in reporting, their opportunity to do so arises out of a principle that is fundamental to our society and method of government: except in extraordinary circumstances, the courts of the land are open to the public. This principle arises out of the belief that exposure to public scrutiny is the surest safeguard against any risk of the courts abusing their considerable powers. As few members of the public have the time, or even the inclination, to attend courts in person, in a practical sense this principle demands that the media be free to report what goes on in them. 85 In some cases, trial judges have relied upon the principle of open justice to grant media access to documents that have been used in open court. 86 These judges have reasoned that providing access will assist the public to understand the basis on which orders have been made and help reporters to cover court proceedings fairly and accurately. Their judgments emphasise the need to trust the media to report proceedings with The Australian Constitution has been interpreted to require a separation of judicial power from legislative and executive functions at the federal level, but state constitutions have no such requirement. Federal judicial power may be vested in both state and federal courts. When a state court is invested with federal power, the federal government must respect the state's rights to provide for organisation and operation of that court. 88 On the other hand, 'Chapter III courts' (those exercising or possessing the capacity to exercise federal judicial power) must be allowed to operate in a court-like manner. 89 Therefore, Chapter III of the Australian Constitution will limit parliamentary and executive power to regulate the openness of judicial proceedings if the various activities that comprise open justice are part of the 'essential character of a court or ... the nature of judicial power'. 90 In Kable, a majority of the High Court of Australia held that an implied constitutional requirement of institutional integrity prevents state legislatures from vesting non-judicial (executive or administrative) powers in Chapter III courts if the exercise of that power is incompatible with the exercise of federal judicial powers. McHugh J expressed this principle in terms of reasonable perceptions of judicial independence:
While nothing in Ch III prevents a State from conferring non-judicial functions on a State Supreme Court in respect of non-federal matters, those non-judicial functions cannot be of a nature that might lead an ordinary reasonable member of the public to conclude that the Court was not independent of the executive government of the State. 91 _____________________________________________________________________________________ 87 See 
Volume 40 ____________________________________________________________________________________ Other passages in the Kable decision suggested that the implied limitation is concerned with protecting essential characteristics of the judicial process. 92 Subsequent formulations of the Kable principle have tended to focus on these institutional characteristics, of which independence is arguably an important element. For example, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ articulated the Kable principle as follows:
[T]he relevant principle is one which hinges upon maintenance of the defining characteristics of a 'court' ... It is to those characteristics that the reference to 'institutional integrity' alludes. That is, if the institutional integrity of a court is distorted, it is because the body no longer exhibits in some relevant respect those defining characteristics which mark a court apart from other decision-making bodies. 93 The refined Kable principle is most precisely referred to as a principle that safeguards the institutional integrity of Chapter III courts. However, attempts to further define the principle have proven somewhat unsuccessful. In fact, French CJ has twice referred to the undesirability of reducing the principle of institutional integrity to a test or formulation which dictates future outcomes. 94 While Kable was regularly relied upon in argument before the High Court of Australia, attempts by parties to apply the doctrine failed for several years. Until 2009, a majority of the High Court invariably distinguished Kable, seemingly confining that case largely to its facts. In that sense, prior to International Finance Trust Co Ltd v NSW Crime Commission, 95 the Kable decision had largely fallen dormant. 96 However since then, the High Court of Australia has articulated and applied a version of the Kable doctrine at least seven times. 97 On three occasions, it has struck down state legislation based on a principle of institutional integrity. 98 Each of the cases mentioned so far engages with the power to order closed courtrooms, or to hear evidence in camera. In Re Application by the Chief Commissioner of Police (Vic), the High Court was asked to consider an application made for orders that would prevent the publication of evidence given in open court. 103 This evidence related to investigative practices of police, 104 and the Commissioner sought an indefinite publication ban. The Court declined to engage with the substantive issues raised by the case, finding that the Commissioner had not met her burden to demonstrate why leave to appeal should be granted from the trial judge's decision to issue the orders.
Given a substantial rise in the number and variety of non-publication orders being issued in Australia, it was inevitable that the refined Kable principle would be relied upon to pursue judicial suggestions that open justice is an essential characteristic of courts. 105 Hogan v Hinch raised a constitutional challenge to s 42 of the Serious Sex Offenders Monitoring Act 2005 (Vic) ('the Act'). 106 The Act empowered Victorian courts to make and enforce community supervision orders in respect of sex offenders who had served their custodial sentence. Section 42 permitted the court, 'if satisfied that it is in the public interest', to make an order prohibiting publication, inter alia, of material which could identify a person as being the subject of a community supervision proceeding. The defendant Hinch, a controversial media figure, allegedly contravened orders made under s 42 of the Act by publishing names on his website and identifying offenders at a public rally. He challenged s 42 on the basis that it distorted the institutional integrity of courts, was contrary to an implied requirement 'that all State and federal courts must be open to the public and carry out their activities in public' _____________________________________________________________________________________ 99
Volume 40 ____________________________________________________________________________________ and contravened the implied freedom of political expression. 107 The High Court of Australia unanimously upheld the constitutionality of s 42 and denied any absolute requirement of open justice.
The brief leading judgment was written by Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ. These judges held that s 42 did not impermissibly impair the status of Chapter III courts as independent and impartial tribunals because the phrase 'in the public interest', while broad, conferred a legitimate discretionary power upon courts. 108 The expectation that a court would issue reasons for decision, and the availability of ordinary rights of appeal, together with the requirement of subjective mens rea within the offence created by s 42 bolstered the conclusion that this section was constitutionally valid.
The leading judgment distinguished limits on the legislative power to regulate open justice from those exceptions which apply to the common law presumption of open justice. Adopting Gibbs J's reasoning from Russell v Russell, 109 the leading judgment held that there is no 'restriction drawn from Ch III which in absolute terms limits the exercise of the legislative power of the Parliament'. 110 It is implicit within the majority's acceptance of Gibbs J's reasoning that a statutory or executive rule which required closed proceedings in all cases may impair the institutional integrity of the court and thereby violate the refined Kable principle.
Chief Justice French issued separate and more lengthy reasons. He held more clearly than the leading judgment that an 'essential characteristic of courts is that they sit in public. Intermediate courts' decisions suggests that common law exceptions to the principle may be based on necessity, or may need to fit within one of a limited number of pre-existing categories. There exists considerable ambivalence about whether there is a strong common law principle of openness in relation to access to court records, as compared with the higher priority placed on openness in relation to oral proceedings.
Deference to parliament is apparent in all levels of the case law, although a limit to this deference appears from the High Court's emphasis on the need to grant discretion to courts that are statutorily empowered to restrict open justice. If unchecked, deference to parliament has the potential to become a particular threat to the principle of open justice. Returning to a core value of open justice -its capacity to promote informed debate about government, its processes and participants -the executive and legislative arms of government will, at times, have a considerable vested interest in maintaining secrecy in respect of some matters that come before the courts. 114 Courts have a fundamental obligation to decide sensitive disputes impartially, according to generally applicable principles, and publicly. The implied constitutional principle of institutional integrity seems to permit courts invested with federal power to guard the common law tradition of openness to some extent. However, a lack of sustained attention to core principles, and a failure to consider how the heterogeneous manifestations of open justice engage those principles differently has led to inconsistencies within the Australian approach to court records and the role of the media. Appellate courts have offered little guidance to trial judges about how best to steer a course between safeguarding open justice and protecting countervailing interests. In contrast, Canadian courts have crafted a more coherent test that seeks to vindicate the principle of open justice in the most challenging cases, while paying careful attention to countervailing interests.
C
The Canadian approach to open justice
The Supreme Court of Canada has articulated a strong commitment to the principle that any decision to limit public access to courts and court records should not be taken lightly. Canadian judges have sought to articulate a structured approach to balancing _____________________________________________________________________________________ should be closed to the general public when the accused is a child); and s 195 Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) (prohibiting publication of questions ruled improper or otherwise not permitted by a trial judge. There may well be good reasons to impose blanket -or at least prima facie -prohibitions in such cases. 114 In Attorney General of Nova Scotia v MacIntyre, the Court identified a common law right to access court records. 116 The Court considered whether a journalist could obtain access to a search warrant and associated information. 117 The majority identified a number of 'broad policy considerations' at stake, including individual rights to privacy, protection of the administration of justice, the need to implement parliamentary intention with respect to search warrants and 'a strong public policy in favour of "openness" in respect of judicial acts.' 118 Rejecting the argument that privacy interests justify routine secrecy in respect of executed search warrants, Dickson J declared that 'covertness is the exception and openness the rule' in relation to court records. 119 Open access is accordingly presumptive but this 'right' can be curtailed to the extent necessary to protect an ongoing investigation, for example if a search warrant had not yet been executed. A fruitless search warrant should remain sealed in order to protect the privacy interests of innocent people.
MacIntyre preceded the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms by three months, and the common law right identified in that case was soon supplemented with s 2(b) of the Charter, which protects the right to freedom of expression, including freedom of the press and other media. In a series of decisions beginning with Edmonton Journal v Alberta (Attorney General), 120 the Supreme Court of Canada has identified the right to gain access to and communicate information regarding court proceedings as a core aspect of section 2(b). Based on this right, the Court struck down a statutory provision which significantly restricted the information that could be published about divorces and associated proceedings. 121 Writing the leading judgment, Cory J held that 'the courts must be open to public scrutiny and to public criticism of their operation'. 122 The media were regarded as central to this openness, because freedom of expression incorporates a 'right to information pertaining to public institutions', meaning that those who are unable to attend court have a right to learn what has transpired there. 123 Cory J held that this right applies equally to court proceedings and court documents. 124 In Ibid [7] . 123 Ibid [17] . 124 Ibid. 125 [1994] 3 SCR 835. a fair trial, which prioritized the right to a fair trial above countervailing rights. 126 Lamer CJ held instead that courts must achieve a balance between fair trial and other rights when they come into competition with one another. 127 The majority emphasized the range and complexity of interests at stake regarding publication bans. This recognition stemmed to a significant extent from the context of the case, which concerned applications by several accused in historical sexual assault cases for orders restraining the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation from airing a fictional program about sexual assault in Catholic orphanages. 128 The program did not report court proceedings and so did not directly engage the principles of open justice, but the Court's reasoning was quickly applied to non-publication orders and other infringements on open justice. Lamer CJ reformulated the common law rule in which the right to a fair trial had been prioritised over the right to freedom of expression. Restated, the Charter-compliant common law rule asks whether a publication ban is necessary to prevent a real and substantial risk to the fairness of the trial or another pressing interest and, if so, whether the salutary effects of the ban (in protecting a fair trial) outweigh its deleterious effects (on freedom of expression, broadly construed by the Court). 129 The test places the evidentiary and persuasive burden on the party seeking to infringe upon open justice.
The Court elaborated on achieving proportionality between open justice and countervailing interests in Canadian Broadcasting Corporation v New Brunswick (AttorneyGeneral). 130 The Court unanimously upheld the constitutionality of a statutory provision which permitted a sentencing judge to exclude members of the public from proceedings where necessary to uphold the proper administration of justice. The Court held that the statutory provision enabled a judge to craft orders which achieved proportionality between competing Charter rights to freedom of expression, fair trial and privacy, while promoting the proper administration of justice. The Court emphasised that the proper balance between these interests is context-dependent, and will vary from case to case. In R v Mentuck, 131 the Court confirmed the broad application of a proportionality test:
the relevant rights and interests will be aligned differently in different cases, and the purposes and effects invoked by the parties must be taken into account in a case-specific manner. ... The consideration of unrepresented interests must not be taken lightly. 132 The Court emphasised that the trial judge must look for reasonable alternatives to a publication ban, and restrict the scope of any ban as far as possible in order to safeguard open justice.
An express methodology, which starts from the presumption of promoting open justice, has therefore emerged from the Canadian case law. The Dagenais-Mentuck test requires the Court to engage in a careful identification of the interests engaged by an
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Volume 40 ____________________________________________________________________________________ application to limit open justice -including those interests that are not directly represented by any party to the proceeding. 133 Next, the necessity of the limit on open justice to protect a substantial countervailing interest must be considered, with explicit attention paid to the availability and reasonableness of alternative measures. If a limit to open justice is necessary, the court considers the salutary effects of the ban and weighs those benefits against its deleterious effects on the interests that were broadly defined in the first step. The limit will be imposed only if its benefits outweigh its harms, and the scope of that limit will be as narrow as is reasonable to achieve the salutary effect. The burden of demonstrating the necessity for a limit on open justice remains with the party seeking that limit throughout the process.
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks ushered in a new era of government secrecy, and a heightened sense of the potential risks of openness in court proceedings. In the wake of 9/11, Canada introduced new substantive crimes and special procedures for investigating suspected terrorist offences. One such provision permitted an investigative hearing to take place, in which witnesses were compelled to attend and answer questions about suspected terrorist offences.
The first judge to conduct an investigative hearing ruled that it should presumptively be conducted in camera. The Supreme Court of Canada rejected this presumption. It restated the open court principle as 'a hallmark of a democratic society' and a 'principal component of the legitimacy of the judicial process'. 134 While a majority accepted that large parts of investigative hearings may necessarily be secret, it held that both the existence of an investigative hearing and as much of the proceedings as possible should be made public. 135 The burden of proving the need for secrecy remains on the party seeking to close the courtroom. The majority took this opportunity to speak strongly against the temptations of secrecy: 'The unfolding of events in this case also illustrates how antithetical to judicial process secret court hearings are. Courthouses are public places.' 136 In 2005, perhaps weary of repeating itself, a unanimous Court rejected an application by the Crown to seal search warrants and associated court records: 'This argument is doomed to failure by more than two decades of unwavering decisions in this Court'. 137 The Court has also upheld limitations on open justice principles, particularly where these limitations are temporary or narrowly drawn. In all cases, such limitations are justified on the strength of countervailing interests. In Re Vancouver Sun, Justice Iacobucci concluded that an application for an investigative hearing must necessarily be held in camera and ex parte. In that decision, the majority also acknowledged that applications for search warrants should also be held in camera and ex parte. 138 In Vickery v Nova Scotia, 139 the Court upheld a decision to deny journalists permission to take a copy of a confession that was excluded from a trial on the grounds that it was involuntarily obtained. In other cases, the Supreme Court of Canada has upheld publication bans on complainants' names in sexual offence cases, 140 and confirmed the constitutionality of court rules that limit court reporters' use of television cameras and interview requests in courthouses. 141 Adult defendants' names are often withheld where identifying the defendant would also identify the complainant. However, the Court has consistently overruled more sweeping publication bans.
The upshot of this whirlwind tour of the Canadian approach to open justice is a strong and persistent commitment to the principle that open justice is a right that should not lightly be infringed. The Court has consistently reinforced the starting presumption of openness, and emphasized that exclusion should constitute the exception. The Court has also developed the Dagenais/Mentuck test to guide a trial judge's determination of whether open access should be limited in a given case. 142 This principle extends a 'firm guarantee of access' to information about court proceedings, including court records. 143 In contrast to the somewhat confusing and sometimes contradictory Australian jurisprudence, the Canadian case law has struck a relatively coherent balance between the principle of open justice and countervailing interests, providing clear guidance to trial judges who are tasked with securing open justice, and maintaining a strong sense of independence from legislative and executive impulses towards secrecy. While the Charter has played an important role in the development of the Dagenais/Mentuck test, the Canadian courts have also identified freestanding common law bases on which to protect open justice. 144 By directing courts to identify and protect the underlying values of open justice while accounting for the diversity of countervailing interests that may arise on a caseby-case basis, the Dagenais/Mentuck test offers a structured approach to managing the heterogeneity of open justice. The Court's rejection of any principled distinction between access to court records and access to court proceedings is in keeping with this focus on the underlying purposes and values of open justice. The Canadian approach is designed to achieve maximum protection of open justice while safeguarding pressing countervailing interests such as the privacy of sexual assault complainants.
A key difference between the Canadian and Australian approaches lies in the preparedness of the Supreme Court of Canada to recognise that the benefits of open justice extend well beyond the media's commercial interest in maximising circulation. 145 Canadian jurisprudence tends to focus on the rights of Canadian citizens to participate in discussion about governance, characterising Canadians' 'right to know about the civil or criminal justice system' as the end to which journalistic access to court information is directed. 146 In this regard, the Canadian approach is very like that
Volume 40 ____________________________________________________________________________________ adopted by the UK Supreme Court in Guardian News and Media. 147 This approach adopts the values central to open justice as a compass by which one may find the right direction through particular disputes about openness.
IV CONCLUSION
Open justice describes a variety of practices that share a common focus on information about courts and a common goal of enabling informed scrutiny of government institutions. Three key features of open justice were identified in section 2: its purposes are multivalent; it can be exercised in diverse ways; and it is not absolute but must be weighed against other values. While the common law has a longstanding commitment to open courtrooms, and to enabling fair and accurate reporting of court proceedings, access to court records is a more contested dimension of the principles of open justice in Australia. Contemporary judicial pronouncements in Canada and England suggest a strong commitment to open justice. This is especially true of Canada, where the Dagenais/Mentuck test applies to any measure taken to infringe open justice and adopts an expansive interpretation of activities protected by that 'right'. The primary benefit of the Canadian approach is that it accounts for the variety of interests at stake when open justice is engaged, with particular attention to the public interest in knowing about court processes and government action; and provides guidance to trial judges who must decide applications to limit open justice. Rather than adopting a binary approach to granting access, Canadian courts have crafted outcomes which maximise the openness of justice while safeguarding pressing countervailing interests such as the privacy of sexual assault complainants. A key dimension of the Canadian approach is a resistance to categorical reasoning in favour of a recognition that the diverse principles of open justice, and the range of countervailing interests that may potentially be engaged, require careful analysis on a case-by-case basis. The Dagenais/Mentuck test structures that analysis in a manner that ensures that no single interest is prioritised without regard to others. Under the Canadian approach, the sphere of conflict between open justice and countervailing principles is carefully delineated before any decision to limit open justice is contemplated. When a direct conflict arises the court first decides whether the public interest requires that open justice should yield to a countervailing interest in the particular circumstances and, if so, seeks to achieve a resolution that impairs open justice as little as possible while safeguarding the prioritised interest. This approach provides a helpful template for Australian courts.
In Australia, the status of some open justice principles is considerably more uncertain. The High Court of Australia has not offered clear guidance about open justice, although it seemingly now considers some aspects of open courts to be an essential characteristic of the judicial process. Older case law emphasises parliament's power to limit the principle of open justice, but emerging Chapter III case law provides a potential foundation from which to challenge the margins of that power. Judgments suggest that statutes may vest judges with discretion to limit open justice but also hold that parliament must not mandate closed courts. 148 and it is unclear whether courts possess an inherent power to issue non-publication orders that bind non-parties. The prevailing common law approach to limits on open justice seemingly turns on whether an application fits within a rigid set of pre-existing categories, or their analogues. This approach steers judges away from substantive engagement with the values protected by open justice, and those that stand opposed to it. However, the discussion provided in section 2 of this article suggests that open justice is too fundamental to judicial integrity and the separation of powers to be rendered vulnerable to parliamentary or executive control and too chimeric to be reduced to ossified categories of exclusion and inclusion. The Canadian approach to balancing the principle of open justice against competing values is to be preferred. One common theme is the role of the media vis-a-vis the principle of open justice. The public interest in knowing about courts provides compelling reasons to adopt a robust system of open justice. However, Australian judges have expressed concern about the extent to which media outlets can be trusted to discharge their obligations to provide fair and accurate reporting of court proceedings. In cases where access is denied or non-publication orders are issued, judges in both jurisdictions often cite a concern about whether media reports of a proceeding will be inflammatory or simply misunderstood. This concern is arguably well-founded, and it is particularly acute in respect of jury trials prior to the commencement of a trial. However, general concern about media trustworthiness should not, in the absence of more specific evidence, compel non-publication orders or denials of access to court records.
The public interest in obtaining access to detailed and knowledgeable information about court processes should never be curtailed without careful consideration. In the absence of detailed and accurate information, misconception and prejudice is likely to flourish. Media can report court proceedings more accurately (and thereby be held to correspondingly higher standards) if they have access to better information. The need to ensure good information is particularly acute in cases which depend on a detailed documentary record or which turn on technical arguments. An increase in lengthy and complicated cases, coupled with a growing reliance on documentary records, highlights the need for effective public access to court records.
Judges and legal academics share an interest in encouraging informed debate and discussion about the judicial system:
The law, of course, largely controls the degree to which the open court principle is respected. 'Legal culture', however, has as much to do with the fortunes of the 'open court principle' as does the law. The law often provides only standards -not clear answers. The extent to which the open court principle is respected therefore comes down to attitude or the commitment to it among justice system participants. 149 Although there are risks inherent in openness, retreating to covertness holds tremendous dangers for the justice system and for democratic governance. Australia deserves a more fully reasoned judicial commitment to open justice than it has, in recent years, received. _____________________________________________________________________________________ 149 Paciocco, above n 14, 386.
